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See A
Theory of Ethics for a first-principle
discussion
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Matt Ball & Jack Norris
Those who exploit and mistreat animals generally
defend their activities on the grounds that animals
lack even basic rights.
Is this true, or do people deny animals rights
simply to rationalize exploiting them?
In searching for an honest, consistent ethic, if
one believes that humans have rights, we find that
there are no legitimate grounds for rejecting rights
for all other animals.
Contents
What is meant by "Rights"
In most of the world, human beings are granted basic
rights. These fundamental rights are usually (at a
minimum): the entitlement of individuals to have basic
control of their lives and bodies, without infringing
on the rights of others. In other words: the right
not to be killed, caged, or experimented on against
their will at the hands of moral agents (persons able
to understand and act from a moral code). It is assumed
that the reader believes humans to have these rights.
A Difference of Degree
Many say that humans deserve rights while other animals
do not because humans have a greater level of certain
characteristics: humans are more intelligent, creative,
aware, technologically advanced, dominant, able to
use language, able to enter into contracts, able to
make moral choices, etc. Thus, humans deserve rights
because they have a greater degree of these characteristics.
This argument has two problems:
-
Rights are not relevant to a group (e.g., "humans"),
but only to individuals. Individuals, not groups,
are exploited and are capable of suffering and
dying; individuals, not groups, are denied rights
when there is a morally relevant reason (e.g.,
after committing a crime).
-
Not all humans possess these characteristics
to a greater degree than all other non-humans.
There are non-humans who are more intelligent,
creative, aware, dominant, technologically advanced
(in reference to tool making), and able to use
language, than some humans (such as infants or
severely handicapped humans). Furthermore, many
animals perform actions that, in humans, would
be labeled moral behavior; oftentimes some animals
act more ethically than many humans. If rights
were granted at a certain threshold of intelligence,
creativity, moral behavior, etc., some animals
would have rights and some humans would not.
Value to Others
Some say that even though infants do not possess
high levels of some characteristics, they should be
granted rights because they are valued by other humans
(their parents, for instance). By this argument, infants
themselves do not possess any inherent rights, but
receive them only if valued by an adult human.
At the same time, being valued by an adult human
does not grant rights to pigs, parakeets, pet rocks,
or Porsches. This is inconsistent: either one is granted
rights by being valued by an adult human–and
thus everything valued by an adult human has rights–or
there must be different criteria for granting rights.
People who believe that rights are granted to infants
because of their value to adult humans would have
to admit that infants who are not valued by other
humans could be used in medical research. Indeed,
this would be morally imperative in order to benefit
infants who are valued by others. Most people would
contend, however, that even unvalued orphans have
rights. Therefore, rights must be based on other criteria.
Biological Rights
Another argument is that humans have rights because
they belong to the species Homo sapiens. In other
words, a chimpanzee may very well be as intelligent
(or creative, etc.) as some humans, but chimpanzees
do not have rights because they are not members of
the biologically-defined, rights-bearing species,
Homo sapiens.
In the past, there have been a number of biological
definitions of what constitutes a species. Today,
it is defined genetically. The questions then become:
-
Why should rights be deserved solely on the basis
of a certain arrangement of genes?
-
Among the genes that determine one’s eye
color, etc., which gene is it that confers rights?
-
If rights should be based on genes, why should
the line be drawn at the species level? Why shouldn’t
the line be drawn at race, order, phylum, or kingdom?
A thoughtful person might find having their rights
(or lack thereof) determined by a molecular sequence
to be a bit absurd. It is no better than basing rights
on the pigmentation of one’s skin (which is also
determined by the individual’s genetic code).
Consider if we could genetically engineer humanoids
who were biologically distinct from humans (could
not reproduce with humans) but shared human emotions
and intelligence. Could we justifiably enslave, experiment
on, and eat such people?
The Law
Some argue that infants and the mentally handicapped
deserve rights because the current laws grant them
rights. However, legal rights are not the same as
moral rights. Legal rights change over time and by
the whim of public or governmental opinion, whereas
inherent moral rights do not. For example, the law
in Nazi Germany did not respect the inherent rights
of Jewish people.
Ability to Understand Abstract
Concepts
It has been argued that non-humans do not deserve
rights because they cannot understand abstract concepts,
such as death. Yet anyone who has observed pigs in
a slaughterhouse, for example, would find it difficult
not to conclude that pigs understand death to the
extent that they are terrified when confronted with
it. What more do humans understand about death that
is morally relevant?
The Golden Rule
In the past, humans may have respected each other’s
rights in order to survive without constant violence.
Many people still function on this level. Yet over
time, more civilized people have evolved a moral system
that grants rights not just based on self-protection,
but on the Golden Rule–treat your neighbor as
you would like to be treated. We know that we want
to stay alive, do not wish to suffer, etc., and we
assume others like us have the same desires. Being
capable of looking beyond our own individual interests,
we apply the Golden Rule even to people who could
not harm us.
How much like us do beings have to be before we include
them under the Golden Rule? At one time, women were
not enough like the men who held power to be granted
many rights. Neither were minorities in the United
States and other societies. Even though the circle
has expanded to include these individuals in the United
States, today other animals are still not considered
sufficiently like us for the majority of people to
treat these animals as our neighbors under the Golden
Rule.
The Soul
Some would say having a God-given soul is what gives
one rights. There is no way to prove that humans have
souls, just as there is no way to prove that all other
animals lack souls. Those who insist that only humans
have souls (and thus rights) are faced with a theological
dilemma: it would require a cruel God to create beings
with the capacity to feel pain and the desire to live,
if these animals’ purpose was to suffer at the
hands of humans.
Animals Kill Each Other
Some defend humans killing animals on the grounds
that animals kill each other in nature. These people
would be hard pressed to show that our modern systems
of animal agriculture or experimentation are "natural."
While it is true that some animals kill other animals
in nature, moral philosophy is based on principles,
not excused by the actions of others. As Peter Singer
writes: "You cannot evade responsibility by imitating
beings who are incapable of making [an ethical] choice."
Some humans assault, rape, or kill other humans, yet
we do not condone these actions.
Appeals to Emotion
as Justification for Vivisection
Vivisection defenders often use emotional, hypothetical
choices to make animal exploitation appear necessary.
For example, concerning her daughter Claire, who has
cystic fibrosis, Jane McCabe wrote in Newsweek (Dec.
26, 1988): "If you had to choose between saving a
very cute dog or my equally cute, blond, brown-eyed
daughter, whose life would you choose?…It’s
not that I don’t love animals, it’s that
I love Claire more."
A single dog experiment could never cure her child’s
disease, but the moral issue is whether personal attachment
justifies harming innocent others. Since McCabe probably
loves her daughter more than other children, would
she endorse experimenting on other children (a scientifically
more productive research strategy than experimenting
on non-human animals) to save her child?
Strict Utilitarianism
Still, many people view vivisection as a morally-defensible
trade-off of lives. For example, the transplant surgeon
involved in experiments such as the baboon heart/Baby
Faye operation assumes that the life of one human
is worth more than that of one baboon. This issue–inter-species
transplants–most clearly demonstrates the problem
of determining morality from a utilitarian algebra
of worth.
Using simple equations to determine the morality
of actions, it would be acceptable to take the life
of one human infant to continue the lives of two other
infants in need of organs. Indeed, arguing from the
perspective of worth, importance, or priorities, taking
the life of one infant to extend the lives of two
would be imperative. If this is not considered to
be acceptable, is the first infant then "more important"
than the two who are allowed to die?
Most people will agree that it is not justifiable
to "sacrifice" one human for the "greater good," because
each human has a right to live. This right is not
to be violated, regardless of possible benefit to
others. But when it comes to animals, they are assumed
not to have this right.
Suffering
Searching for some characteristic to justify granting
rights to all humans while denying rights to all other
animals is futile. A moral system based on any of
the characteristics discussed so far would either
include many non-human animals or exclude some humans.
To have a consistent set of ethics, a characteristic
must be found that not only allows for the inclusion
of all humans, but is also morally relevant. The only
characteristic that simply and consistently meets
these requirements is the capacity for suffering.
As Jeremy Bentham, head of the Department of Jurisprudence
at Oxford University during the 19th century, said
in reference to his belief that animals should be
granted moral consideration, "The question is not,
‘Can they reason?’ nor, ‘Can they talk?’
But rather, ‘Can they suffer?’"
If a thing cannot suffer, then it does not matter
to that being what happens to it. For example, computers
have forms of intelligence (in many ways greater than
that of any human), but these machines do not care
whether they are turned off or even destroyed.
On the other hand, if a being is able to have subjective
experiences of pleasure and pain, then it does matter–to
that individual–what happens to it. Irrespective
of intelligence, language, etc., a conscious, sentient
being has interests in its existence–at the very
least to avoid pain and to stay alive. Any complete
ethic cannot ignore these concerns.
For the Love of Animals
There are many who claim that they love animals and
don’t want them to suffer. Few oppose "humane"
treatment of animals. But fewer still are willing
to give up their prejudice of human superiority. Thus,
the distance between the acceptable treatment and
the actual, institutionalized treatment of these animals
is greater than ever: slaughterhouses are hidden away
from populated areas, and vivisectors’ labs are
closed and locked.
Many scientists claim they use animals only when
it is "absolutely necessary to save human lives."
Ignoring the question of whether or not their contention
of necessity is accurate and what is the ethical use
of limited resources for medical care and research,
these people are betrayed by their actions: how many
vegetarian vivisectors are there? They can hardly
argue that it is necessary for them to kill animals
for food.
In general, the animal welfarist position, which
has been endorsed (but sparsely adopted) by the meat
industry and pro-vivisection groups, is at odds with
a truly respectful relationship based on the recognition
of the rights of other animals. Welfarists concede
that animals have interests, but these animals remain
human property. Thus, the fundamental interests of
the animals remain secondary to any interests of the
owners. Laws based on the welfarist position, such
as the federal Animal Welfare Act, have proven to
be almost useless in every practical sense, as any
use/abuse of an animal is allowed if deemed "necessary."
Trying to legislate a humane balance between the
interests of animals and the interests of humans sounds
good in principle and appeals to most. However, given
that the current system still allows such atrocities
as canned hunts, castration without anesthesia, factory
farms, pain experiments, etc., animal abuse will continue
until the current system recognizes that many animals
are conscious, sentient beings whose rights are independent
of the interests of humans.
Might Makes Right
The children whom the Jane McCabes of the world hold
up to defend vivisection have done nothing to deserve
their disease. It is precisely these children’s
innocence that makes their plight so heartrending.
However, anyone who claims to be ethical must also
ask what animals have done to deserve being imprisoned
in cages, being infected with our diseases, and being
carved up in our labs. No one would suggest that these
animals "deserve" to be exploited and killed in experiments.
Rather, we kill these healthy, innocent beings because
we have the power to do so and it is convenient for
us. In short, we follow the principle of Might Makes
Right.
The ability to do something does not make it right.
We are capable of many actions that most contend are
unacceptable–rape, abuse, murder, etc. If we
have any claim to "superiority," it comes from our
ability to act according to moral principles, guided
by justice, fairness, and compassion. But we deny
our moral ability when we selfishly harm others.
Animal Morality
Even though rights can only be granted consistently
and justly on the basis of the capacity to suffer
and not on the ability to make moral choices, there
is ample evidence that many animals can and do make
moral choices, often to the shame of "superior" humans.
As Drs. Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan relate in Shadows
of Forgotten Ancestors:
In the annals of primate ethics, there
are some accounts that have the ring of parable. In
a laboratory setting, macaques were fed if they were
willing to pull a chain and electrically shock an
unrelated macaque whose agony was in plain view through
a one-way mirror. Otherwise, they starved. After learning
the ropes, the monkeys frequently refused to pull
the chain; in one experiment only 13% would do so–87%
preferred to go hungry. One macaque went without food
for nearly two weeks rather than hurt its fellow.
Macaques who had themselves been shocked in previous
experiments were even less willing to pull the chain.
The relative social status or gender of the macaques
had little bearing on their reluctance to hurt others.
If asked to choose between the human experimenters
offering the macaques this Faustian bargain and
the macaques themselves–suffering from real
hunger rather than causing pain to others–our
own moral sympathies do not lie with the scientists.
But their experiments permit us to glimpse in non-humans
a saintly willingness to make sacrifices in order
to save others–even those who are not close
kin. By conventional human standards, these macaques–who
have never gone to Sunday school, never heard of
the Ten Commandments, never squirmed through a single
junior high school civics lesson–seem exemplary
in their moral grounding and their courageous resistance
to evil. Among these macaques, at least in this
case, heroism is the norm. If the circumstances
were reversed, and captive humans were offered the
same deal by macaque scientists, would we do as
well? (Especially when there is an authority figure
urging us to administer the electric shocks, we
humans are disturbingly willing to cause pain–and
for a reward much more paltry than food is for a
starving macaque [cf. Stanley Milgram, Obedience
to Authority: An Experimental Overview].) In human
history there are a precious few whose memory we
revere because they knowingly sacrificed themselves
for others. For each of them, there are multitudes
who did nothing.
If animals can feel pain as humans can, and desire
to live as humans do, how can we deny them similar
respect? As moral beings, how can we justify our continued
exploitation of them?
We must stand up against the idea that might makes
right. We must question the status quo which allows
the unquestioned infliction of so much suffering.
We must act from our own ethics, rather than blindly
follow authority figures who tell us it’s okay
and even necessary to harm animals.
Discussing the macaque monkeys who chose to starve
rather than inflict pain on another, Drs. Sagan and
Druyan conclude, "Might we have a more optimistic
view of the human future if we were sure our ethics
were up to their standards?"
For a more complete treatment of the philosophy
of animal rights, see Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal
Rights. For a discussion of the preference utilitarian
philosophy of animal liberation, see Peter Singer’s
Animal
Liberation. Additionally, the Vegetarian Site
has a
summary of some of the current animal rights philosophers.
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